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ADVENTURES ON THE AUTOBAHN AND 
INFOBAHN: UNITED STATES V. JONES, 
MANDATORY DATA RETENTION, AND A 
MORE REASONABLE “REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY” 
John A. Stratford* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 28, 2011, the House Judiciary Committee voted nineteen to 
ten in favor of passing H.R. 1981, also known as the Protecting Children 
from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011.1  Among other provisions aimed 
at stamping out child pornography on the Internet, one particular section of 
the bill stirred up a maelstrom of controversy among privacy and civil 
liberties advocates.  The provision required every Internet service provider 
(ISP) to retain, for a period of at least eighteen months, certain information 
about every user of its service in order to allow law enforcement to access 
records of suspected child pornographers.2 
Many of the same privacy advocates eagerly awaited last year’s 
decision in United States v. Jones.3  In Jones, the Supreme Court 
considered whether extended warrantless GPS tracking of a vehicle by law 
enforcement violates the Fourth Amendment.4 
These two hot-button issues both present concerns about privacy and 
 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of California, 
Santa Barbara, 2005.  The author thanks Jessica Notebaert, the JCLC editorial staff, and 
Professor Martha Kanter for invaluable insight and support. 
1 Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. 
§ 4; H.R. REP. NO. 112–281, pt. 1, at 22–29 (2011); see also Rainey Reitman, House 
Committee Approves Bill Mandating that Internet Companies Spy on Their Users, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 28, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2011/07/house-committee-approves-bill-mandating-internet.  As of this writing, the bill 
remains in the House of Representatives, scheduled on the Union Calendar.  
2 H.R. 1981; see also Bipartisan Furor over Data Retention Bill Mars House Judiciary 
Markup, WASH. INTERNET DAILY (July 28, 2011), available at 2011 WLNR 15187895; Greg 
Nojeim, Data Retention Hearing: Opposition from Both Sides, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & 
TECH. (July 13, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/greg-nojeim/137data-retention-hearing-
opposition-both-sides. 
3 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
4 Id. 
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how courts should regulate interactions between individuals and the 
government.  In this Comment, I argue that these two controversies—one 
involving surveillance of Internet users on the infobahn and one involving 
surveillance of drivers on the autobahn—represent and illustrate the same 
underlying problem with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the 
“assumption of risk” doctrine first articulated in Katz v. United States.5  I 
further contend that this doctrine is misguided and has become untenable in 
modern society.  Under a modified Katz test, setting aside the assumption of 
risk doctrine, citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy both in user 
data retained by ISPs and in the totality of the movements of their vehicles.  
The modified Katz test proposed here renders both of these regimes 
presumptively unconstitutional.  Such a modified test would at the very 
least begin the process of bringing the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence back in line with the fundamental principles behind that 
Amendment. 
Part I briefly outlines the history of and controversy surrounding both 
mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS tracking in the context of the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Part II articulates how these two 
controversies can be understood as symptoms of the same problem: the 
assumption of risk doctrine.  It then explains why the current state of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence does not provide adequate safeguards for 
individual privacy and presents the normative reasons supporting a change 
in the doctrine.  Finally, Part III offers a modified “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” framework that excludes the assumption of risk doctrine.  This 
Part concludes that both mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS 
tracking raise grave constitutional concerns under such a test.  It then 
addresses concerns about potential future applications of Katz under this 
test. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND KATZ V. UNITED STATES 
The Fourth Amendment provides a short and rather vague statement 
that acts as almost the sole regulation of conduct between individual 
citizens and law enforcement officers.  It provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
 
5 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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seized.6 
As one commentator notes, “An elaborate regulatory system rests upon 
this one sentence.”7  The Fourth Amendment regulates a myriad of state–
citizen interactions, from more traditional traffic stops, search and frisks, 
and arrests, to high-tech investigatory actions like wiretaps, Internet 
surveillance, and GPS vehicle tracking. 
A recurring question of interpretation in this regulatory system is what 
constitutes a “search” or “seizure” for purposes of the Amendment.  If a 
government action against an individual is not a search or seizure, then the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry ends and there is no further question of whether 
the action was reasonable or whether a warrant was required under the 
Amendment.8  Early Supreme Court decisions focused on whether or not 
the government was interfering with property interests when deciding what 
constituted a search.9  The meaning of a search soon came to be limited to 
physical intrusions, a doctrine that culminated in the Court’s Olmstead 
decision in 1928.10  In that case, the Court held that law enforcement 
tapping an individual’s telephone was not a search because it did not 
involve a physical intrusion into the home.11  This decision was 
immediately criticized for cutting against the normative principles behind 
the Fourth Amendment.12  Was tapping a phone really so unlike invading 
 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
7 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1516 (2010). 
8 The Supreme Court “has created a presumption that a warrant is required, unless 
infeasible, for a search to be reasonable.”  United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (citing cases).  But, as Solove points out, “[d]espite the Court’s pronouncement in 
Katz in 1967 that there are only ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions’ to the warrant requirement, in the decades following Katz, the Court has made 
numerous exceptions.”  Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy Protection, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1119 (2002).  
9 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of [a 
man’s] doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offence; 
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and 
private property.”). 
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
11 Id. at 466. 
12 Indeed, Justice Brandeis offered an eloquent dissent in Olmstead, which now looks 
prophetic considering Katz’s refocusing of the Fourth Amendment on privacy concerns: 
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments [the Fourth and Fifth] is much broader in scope 
[than the protection of property].  The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
of his feelings and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government 
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physical property?  Could the government simply wait until technology 
afforded them the means to monitor citizens wholesale while the Fourth 
Amendment stood idly by? 
Nevertheless, the Court limited Fourth Amendment “searches” to 
physical intrusions until its landmark Katz decision in 1967.13  In Katz, the 
FBI attached a listening device to a phone booth in which the defendant was 
having a conversation about illegal gambling.14  They recorded the 
conversation, having obtained no warrant to do so, and then used the 
recording against him in court.15  Katz argued that his Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable searches was violated, and the Court agreed.16  
Rejecting their previous doctrine of physical intrusion, the Court stated, 
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”17  The test for exactly what was 
“constitutionally protected” is now considered embodied in Justice Harlan’s 
oft-quoted concurrence in the case: “My understanding of the rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”18 
As the doctrine now stands, then, a search for the purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment is a government action that infringes a person’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”19  The test has both subjective (an 
individual’s actual expectation of privacy) and objective (whether society 
 
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 478–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
14 Id. at 348. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 359. 
17 Id. at 351. 
18 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
19 This Comment assumes that Katz correctly held that privacy protection is the 
appropriate and intended purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  It is outside this Comment’s scope to discuss other potential 
justifications, but some commentators argue that privacy should not be the Fourth 
Amendment’s controlling interest.  See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the 
Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1995) (advocating for less focus on 
privacy and more focus on police violence in criminal procedure); Scott E. Sundby, 
“Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and 
Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994) (arguing that the Court’s focus on privacy has 
actually restricted individual rights). 
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deems that expectation reasonable) components.20  Crucially relevant to this 
Comment, however, is what may be seen as Katz’s exception to the general 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test: “What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”21  In the following sections, I show how this part of Katz’s 
holding and its rigid interpretation by the Court has birthed a series of 
controversial rules surrounding searches and privacy, using mandatory data 
retention and warrantless GPS tracking as current examples. 
B. MANDATORY DATA RETENTION AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
Times have changed since Katz was decided in 1967—it is no secret 
that we now live in an age where Internet use has become ubiquitous and is 
arguably a necessity for navigating life in modern society.22  And while the 
Internet offers unprecedented opportunities for communication, education, 
business, and entertainment, it is also the greatest aggregator of personal 
information in human history.23  As users navigate the Internet, they leave 
behind a massive trail of data, including e-mail communication, instant 
messaging, website browsing data, commercial transaction records, and 
even information about software, hardware, and geographic location.24 
It is unsurprising that third parties are increasingly eager to access this 
virtual treasure trove of personal information.  Search engines like Google 
use it to sell tailored advertising;25 marketing firms use it to analyze trends 
in commerce;26 and, relevant to this Comment, law enforcement uses it to 
track down criminal suspects. 
In the United States today, most ISPs retain some data about each of 
their users for a limited period of time.27  This data might include browsing 
 
20 Although the Court has generally considered whether a “reasonable person” would 
have the subjective expectation of privacy, it is worth noting here that the reasonable person 
presupposes an innocent person.  For instance, the Court held in Rakas v. Illinois that the 
Fourth Amendment would not protect a burglar’s subjective expectation of privacy in a 
summer cabin he is attempting to rob.  439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12 (1978). 
21 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
22 According to one source, there were over two billion Internet users worldwide as of 
2011 and over 78% of North Americans were Internet users.  INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com (last visited May 20, 2013). 
23 See Solove, supra note 8, at 1093; Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation 
of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 62–70 (2000). 
24 See Skok, supra note 23, at 64–65. 
25 See Privacy Policy for Google Ads and Advertising Services, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/privacy/ads/privacy-policy.html (last updated July 27, 2012). 
26 See Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, at SR1. 
27 See Is It Legal?: Internet, NEWSLETTER ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, Mar. 1, 2011, at 
83.  
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history, records of e-mail communication, and Internet protocol (IP) 
addresses.28  After a time, this information is often deleted.29  Under current 
data preservation laws, however, law enforcement officials may require 
ISPs to retain certain data about specific customers suspected of crimes to 
assist investigations.30  The government can force ISPs to retain this data 
for up to 180 days as part of its investigation.31 
H.R. 1981, introduced by Representative Lamar Smith of Texas, 
would impose a much more severe regime of “mandatory data retention.”32  
Under a mandatory data retention program, ISPs (or other 
telecommunications providers) are required to retain data about every user 
for a specified period of time.  In the case of H.R. 1981, ISPs would have to 
retain temporarily assigned network addresses of all users for at least one 
year.33  Temporarily assigned network addresses are records of IP addresses 
that the ISP assigns to customers.34  In combination with other 
“clickstream” data—like browsing history, commercial transaction records, 
and communications—these IP addresses would allow law enforcement to 
effectively identify customers and match them up with a comprehensive 
record of online activity.35 
The bill was supported by the Department of Justice and the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police.36  It was met with loud 
opposition from privacy advocates in the media and within the House of 
Representatives.  The Center for Democracy & Technology, for example, 
“urge[d] Congress to fully investigate questions about child pornography 
 
28 An IP address is a unique number that identifies computers on the Internet.  IP 
Address, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary//ip%20 
address (last visited May 20, 2013).  
29 See Is It Legal?: Internet, supra note 27. 
30 See, e.g., Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Child Pornography and 
Other Internet Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland 
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 23–33 (2011) [hereinafter Data 
Retention Hearing] (testimony of Kate Dean, Executive Director, United States Internet 
Service Provider Association); Kristina Ringland, The European Union’s Data Retention 
Directive and the United States’s Data Preservation Laws: Finding the Better Model, 5 
SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 13 (2009), available at http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-
law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/427/vol5_no3_art13.pdf?sequence=1. 
31 Data Retention Hearing, supra note 30, at 24 (testimony of Kate Dean).  
32 H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011).  
33 Id. 
34 For an explanation of how data retention works with respect to IP addresses and 
temporarily assigned network addresses, see Mandatory Data Retention, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/mandatory-data-retention (last visited May 20, 
2013). 
35 Id. 
36 See Is It Legal?: Internet, supra note 27, at 83. 
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investigations before it consider[ed] imposing burdensome and costly 
mandates on American industry that, in turn, harm the civil liberties of 
American citizens.”37  Failed data-retention bills introduced in the past have 
met similar opposition.38 
Europe implemented a mandatory data-retention directive in 2006,39 
also in the face of great controversy,40 and other countries have likewise 
faced opposition in introducing data-retention laws.41 
While many opponents of mandatory data retention cite concerns of 
cost and practicality,42 privacy advocates are particularly worried that H.R. 
1981 will be an irresistible temptation to law enforcement officials who 
would have access to a vast amount of customer information without the 
need for a search warrant.  As of this writing, the Bill is still on the House 
of Representatives’ Union Calendar.43 
The data-retention discussion above begs the question: why wouldn’t 
law enforcement officials need a warrant to access this type of online user 
data?  It might follow from a commonsense interpretation of a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” that data about Internet usage would be exactly the 
kind of information that the Katz Court, in its rejection of physical 
limitations on searches, wanted to protect from the prying eyes of the 
government.  But the issue that floats just beneath the surface of the 
mandatory data-retention controversy is Katz’s holding that information 
“knowingly expose[d]” to public view is not subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection.  In the context of customer data retained by ISPs, the 
 
37 Data Retention Hearing, supra note 30, at 34–45 (testimony of John Morris, General 
Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology). 
38 See Leslie Harris, Internet Safety Act Would Make Us Less Safe, ABC NEWS (Mar. 12, 
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/AheadoftheCurve/story?id=7060343&page=1#.
UVWl5RyPMs5 (criticizing the Internet Safety Act of 2009, a similar data-retention bill). 
39 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54–56, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF. 
40 See, e.g., “Monumentous Battle” Said Raging over Telecom Data Storage, COMM. 
DAILY, Nov. 4, 2005; Warwick Ashford, EEF Calls for ISP Data Retention Law to Be 
Scrapped, COMPUTER WKLY. (Oct. 26, 2010, 4:58 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/
news/1280094182/EEF-calls-for-ISP-data-retention-law-to-be-scrapped. 
41 See, e.g., John Fotiadis, Cyber Crime: Big Brother Is Watching, BANGKOK POST (Aug. 
15, 2008), http://www.tilleke.com/sites/default/files/cyber_crime.pdf (detailing new 
mandatory data-retention laws in Thailand); Sean Parnell, Canberra Rethinks Retention 
Regime on ISP Subscriber Records, AUSTRALIAN (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/foi/canberra-rethinks-retention-regime-on-isp-
subscriber-records/story-fn8r0e18-1226101609674 (discussing plans for an Australian data-
retention regime). 
42 See, e.g., Data Retention Hearing, supra note 30, at 23–33 (testimony of Kate Dean). 
43 Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. 
§ 4. 
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government is allowed access via the third-party doctrine. 
The third-party doctrine essentially holds that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect from government intrusion any information that an 
individual willingly offers to a third party.44 
The doctrine finds its roots in pre-Katz cases dealing with government 
informants.  In Hoffa v. United States, for example, the Court held that the 
defendant had no expectation of privacy in conversations with an associate 
who later turned out to be a government informant.45  In a precursor to later 
cases dealing with the assumption of risk doctrine, the Court reasoned that 
the Fourth Amendment afforded no protection to “a wrongdoer’s misplaced 
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will 
not reveal it.”46 
After Katz, the third-party doctrine was solidified in United States v. 
White.47  In White, the government relied on testimony from law 
enforcement agents who used a radio transmitter to listen in on 
conversations between the defendant and a government informant.48  White 
argued that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his 
expectation of privacy in the conversation with the informant.  Relying in 
part on the pre-Katz cases involving government informants discussed 
above,49 the Court held that White had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the conversation: 
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his 
companions may be reporting to the police.  If he sufficiently doubts their 
trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize.  But if he 
has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.50 
In essence, anything told to another, no matter what the subjective 
expectation of privacy in that information, is not private enough to meet the 
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. 
Five years after White, the Court significantly expanded the third-party 
doctrine in United States v. Miller, a case more closely analogous to the 
 
44 Many scholars discuss the evolution and meaning of the third-party doctrine in detail 
that is beyond the scope of this Comment.  See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Automation and the 
Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 596–600 (2011). 
45 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966). 
46 Id.; see also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment was not implicated by sending an undercover agent to the defendant’s house to 
make a purchase of narcotics from the defendant); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 
437–39 (1963) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by an undercover 
agent using a recording device to record a conversation with the defendant). 
47 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
48 Id. at 746–47. 
49 Id. at 749 (citing cases). 
50 Id. at 752. 
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issue of data retention by ISPs.51  Faced with a society of individuals who 
increasingly exposed more and more of their information to third parties via 
new technology, and not just in personal conversations, the Court stuck 
with the logic of the third-party doctrine.  Miller involved the retention of 
customer bank records and whether or not it was a Fourth Amendment 
search for the government to access them.  Relying on White to reject 
Miller’s claim of Fourth Amendment protection of the records, the Court 
held, “The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that 
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”52  
Reaching back to the government-informer cases, the Court further 
declared: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.53 
Three years after Miller, the Court in Smith v. Maryland considered the 
third-party doctrine in the context of a pen register device used by a 
telephone company to record phone numbers dialed by the defendant.54  In 
this third landmark case, the Court held that the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed: “When 
he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to 
the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in 
the ordinary course of business.  In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk 
that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”55 
The Court has kept the third-party doctrine alive in the face of 
advancing technology and a society that increasingly exposes more and 
more individual information to third parties.  In White, the protected 
information was disclosed via word of mouth; in Miller, via written records; 
and in Smith, via numbers dialed on a home telephone.56  What about 
information disclosed via the Internet?  The answer is that although there is 
 
51 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
52 Id. at 443. 
53 Id. (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751–52).  There was already a suggestion of some 
limitation on the third-party doctrine here, however: the Court also noted that “the checks 
[were] not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial 
transactions.”  Id. at 442. 
54 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979). 
55 Id. at 744. 
56 See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–52 (1989) (holding no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a greenhouse with a missing window where a government plane 
flew above it and discovered marijuana plants inside); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 
35, 39–43 (1988) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags placed on 
the defendant’s curb). 
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a somewhat complex scheme of statutory protections in place for data 
transmitted online,57 law enforcement is still able to access a vast amount of 
data held by ISPs without the need for a warrant.58  The controversy over 
mandatory data retention is simply over which information ISPs must hold 
and for how long. 
C. WARRANTLESS GPS TRACKING 
United States v. Jones represents one new frontier in a long-standing 
battle over the constitutionality of electronic surveillance.59  In Jones, the 
defendants were suspected of possession and distribution of cocaine.  
Government agents planted a GPS60 tracking device on Jones’s vehicle and 
tracked the location of the vehicle every ten seconds for a month.61  They 
did so without a warrant.62  Using location data from the GPS along with 
cell phone records, the government at trial was able to paint a 
comprehensive and incriminating picture of Jones’s activity.  The issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether this extended warrantless 
monitoring by GPS was a violation of Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Government argued that under the Court’s decision in United 
States v. Knotts, the use of the GPS tracking device was not a “search” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes because Jones had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the public movements of his vehicle.63 
In Knotts, law enforcement agents in Minnesota attached an electronic 
“beeper” tracking device to a drum of chloroform that they suspected was 
going to be used by the defendant for manufacturing illegal drugs.64  Once 
the drum was placed in a vehicle, agents used the device to track the 
vehicle’s movements to a cabin, which they then obtained a warrant to 
 
57 For a thorough analysis of the statutory regime of protections regulating government 
access to third-party records, see Solove, supra note 8, at 1138–51.  Although there are 
statutes regulating areas like wiretapping, access to stored communications, financial 
records, and medical records, Solove concludes that it is inadequate to “fill the void created 
by the judicial evisceration of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 1150. 
58 Id.; see also Catherine Crump, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and 
Accountability Online, 56 STAN. L. REV. 191, 196 (2003). 
59 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
60 The Global Positioning System is a network of U.S.-owned satellites used to pinpoint 
locations on the surface of Earth.  See GPS Overview, GPS.GOV, www.gps.gov/systems/gps 
(last modified Jan. 17, 2013). 
61 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
62 Id. (explaining that the police had actually obtained a warrant earlier in the 
investigation, but installed the GPS device after the warrant had expired). 
63 460 U.S. 276, 280–85 (1983). 
64 Id. at 277. 
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search.  They used the evidence found therein to convict Knotts.  The Court 
ruled that there was no expectation of privacy in the movements of a 
vehicle along public streets—this was essentially information that was 
“knowingly exposed” to the public.  And although Knotts argued that the 
use of the electronic tracking device was different than a law enforcement 
officer following him in person, the Court dismissed the beeper as only 
being of “limited use” and noted that a police officer could have gleaned the 
same information that the beeper had with the naked eye.65 
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have relied on Knotts to hold that 
using a GPS device to track and monitor an individual’s movements in his 
vehicle over an extended period of time is not a Fourth Amendment search.  
In United States v. Garcia,66 police placed a GPS tracking device on the 
defendant Garcia’s vehicle and used it to track him to a field where they 
found evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing.  Prosecutors used this 
evidence to convict Garcia.  Although the court expressed some concern 
about the potential implications of a GPS surveillance regime on privacy 
protection,67 it held that use of the GPS device was not a Fourth 
Amendment search.  The court’s justification rested in part on the 
observation that use of the GPS device was merely a substitute for good 
old-fashioned police surveillance, which was “unequivocally not a search 
within the meaning of the [Fourth A]mendment.”68 
In United States v. Pineda-Moreno, the named defendant was observed 
purchasing supplies often used in growing marijuana.69  Federal agents then 
undertook an extensive investigation of Pineda-Moreno, installing GPS 
tracking devices on his vehicle on seven different occasions.70  When the 
GPS device alerted the agents that Pineda-Moreno was leaving a suspected 
marijuana growing site, they followed his car, arrested him, and eventually 
got consent to search his home and trailer, where they found marijuana.71  
The Ninth Circuit, considering the question whether the use of the GPS 
devices was a Fourth Amendment search, concluded that it was not: “The 
only information the agents obtained from the tracking devices was a log of 
 
65 Id. at 285.  The Court also foresaw future difficulties in dealing with advancing 
technology that might not constitute such a “limited use.”  But in addressing the question of 
whether a warrant would be required in a case involving prolonged, round-the-clock 
surveillance, the Court declined to answer: “[I]f such dragnet-type law enforcement practices 
as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”  Id. at 283–84. 
66 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007). 
67 See infra notes 90 and 102. 
68 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
69 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010). 
70 Id. at 1213. 
71 Id. 
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the locations where Pineda-Moreno’s car traveled, information the agents 
could have obtained by following the car.”72  Relying on Garcia as 
persuasive authority, the court reasoned that the use of the GPS device was 
simply a substitute for an activity that was not a search—that is, in-person 
surveillance by a police officer—and that this substitution did not 
fundamentally change the fact that Pineda-Moreno’s movements were 
exposed to the public.73 
However, the lower court decision in Jones, United States v. Maynard, 
distinguished Knotts in holding that warrantless GPS tracking of the type 
used in Jones was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.74  The 
Maynard court invoked the mosaic theory, a central concept in intelligence 
gathering more often applied in the national security context.75  The theory 
holds that individual data points, while perhaps not revealing on their own, 
can be highly revealing if aggregated and analyzed as a whole.76  In 
applying the mosaic theory to GPS tracking, the Court reasoned that “[t]he 
whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not constructively 
exposed to the public because, like a rap sheet, the whole reveals far more 
than the individual movements it comprises . . . no single journey reveals 
the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life 
and a way of life.”77  Essentially, because GPS tracking revealed a more 
intimate and detailed picture of Jones’s activities, the court found a 
conceptual difference between this type of surveillance and the use of the 
beeper in Knotts.78 
In the end, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones declined to 
 
72 Id. at 1216. 
73 Id. 
74 Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
75 For a discussion of the mosaic theory in general and its evolution in the context of the 
Freedom of Information Act, see generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National 
Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005). 
76 Id. 
77 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.  The Maynard court also noted that the Supreme Court 
“implicitly recognized the distinction between the whole and the sum of the parts in the 
Fourth Amendment case of Smith v. Maryland,” and “considered not just whether a 
reasonable person expects any given number he dials to be exposed to the phone company 
but also whether he expects all the numbers he dials to be compiled in a list.” Id. 
78 See also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).  In Weaver, the Court of 
Appeals of New York similarly distinguished the use of a GPS tracking device from the 
beeper in Knotts:  
One need only consider what the police may learn, practically effortlessly, from planting a single 
[GPS] device.  The whole of a person’s progress through the world, into both public and private 
spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over lengthy periods possibly limited only by the 
need to change the transmitting unit’s batteries. 
Id. at 1199. 
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frame the issue as one falling under Katz’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test.  Instead, the Court held the GPS tracking was a Fourth 
Amendment search because it was a trespass to place the tracking device on 
Jones’s car—it did not hold that Jones had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the movements of his vehicle.79  Relying on a Boyd-like 
conception of invasion of property rights as a Fourth Amendment search, 
the Court noted that Katz was viable, but that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy was not the sole criterion for defining a search.80 
After the Court’s narrow holding in Jones,81 privacy advocates 
continue to argue that GPS technology, like mandatory data retention, 
provides the government another “irresistible temptation” to undertake 
unreasonably broad monitoring of individuals.82 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. THE “ASSUMPTION OF RISK” DOCTRINE 
This Part argues that the controversies over mandatory data retention 
and warrantless GPS tracking are symptoms of the same problem—the 
assumption of risk doctrine implicit and often explicit in the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
The assumption of risk language stems from the Court’s consideration 
of retaining bank records in the Miller case: “The depositor takes the risk, 
in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by 
that person to the Government.”83  But the central idea of the assumption of 
risk doctrine is rooted in the language of Katz, nineteen years before: “What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”84 
On its face, the language seems to echo the “plain view” doctrine used 
by courts in the Fourth Amendment context.  As Justice Harlan noted in his 
concurrence in Katz, “[O]bjects, activities or statements that [an individual] 
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no 
 
79 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
80 Id. at 951. 
81 See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, Why Jones Is Still Less of a Pro-Privacy Decision than Most 
Thought, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/
why-jones-is-still-less-of-a-pro-privacy-decision-than-most-thought/. 
82 See, e.g., Editorial, Is GPS Tracking Too ‘1984’?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at A22; 
GPS Inventor Joins EFF in Fight Against Warrantless GPS Tracking, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2011/10/03-0; Frank 
Miniter, Is the Right to Privacy Dead?, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2011, 4:09 PM), 
www.forbes.com/sites/frankminiter/2011/11/17/is-the-right-to-privacy-dead/. 
83 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
84 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”85  If a police officer 
pulls a vehicle over for a traffic stop and happens to see the passenger 
carrying drugs through the window, it is not a violation of that passenger’s 
Fourth Amendment rights for the officer to seize the drugs—the contraband 
was there for anyone to see.  Similarly, if a homeowner puts a sign on his 
front lawn declaring himself a criminal, he has “knowingly exposed” this 
information to the public and it violates no Fourth Amendment right for the 
government to use that information against him under the plain view 
doctrine. 
As discussed above, the Court has applied this rationale repeatedly, 
holding in various contexts that any information disclosed to a third party is 
no longer “private” and thus is no longer protected by the Fourth 
Amendment—no matter what actual, subjective expectation of privacy the 
defendant held.  In White and the government-informer cases, defendants 
gave information by word of mouth to another.  In Miller, the defendant 
entrusted the bank with checks and deposit slips.  In Smith, the defendant 
exposed the phone numbers he dialed to the phone company.  But did any 
of these individuals actually expect that they had no privacy interest in their 
respective information that was “knowingly exposed” to outsiders?  
Common sense seems to dictate that Mr. Miller should reasonably expect 
some modicum of privacy in the records kept by his bank, or that Mr. Smith 
would be allowed some reasonable amount of surprise to find out that every 
phone number he dialed would be exposed to the government.86 
The same rationale applies in the line of GPS tracking cases.  In 
Knotts, the defendant “knowingly exposed” the movements of his vehicle to 
the public and thus, the inquiry was over—he could have no “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” against the tracking of his vehicle by the 
government.  Following Knotts, the courts in Garcia and Pineda-Moreno 
used the same rationale to allow extensive warrantless GPS tracking of the 
defendants’ vehicles, no matter what the actual expectation of privacy was 
on the part of Garcia or Pineda-Moreno.  If one were to ask Mr. Garcia 
himself, or a reasonable cross section of society,87 whether or not they 
would expect the government to be tracking their vehicles’ every move for 
days or weeks at a time, it seems difficult to argue that they would answer 
in the affirmative.88 
 
85 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
86 See infra text accompanying notes 125–135 for empirical studies on subjective 
expectations of privacy. 
87 The author here notes the obvious difficulty of defining such a group, but the argument 
remains the same—a “commonsense” understanding would be another way to phrase it. 
88 See infra text accompanying notes 131–133; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 964 (2012) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others 
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One only has to look at the public outcry over mandatory data 
retention and warrantless GPS tracking to see that the assumption of risk 
doctrine has birthed controversial results in these two areas.89 
In fact, mandatory data retention can be characterized as the logical 
extension of the assumption of risk doctrine, which allows warrantless GPS 
tracking.  In both controversies, the assumption of risk doctrine allows the 
government to access data that has been “voluntarily exposed” by 
individuals: in one case, Internet usage data exposed to an ISP, and in the 
other, physical location data exposed to the general public.  With respect to 
the Internet, the court-imposed regime is already far along the path of total 
surveillance; it has decided that information exposed to ISPs is no longer 
private.  The data-retention controversy is about how much of that data law 
enforcement agencies will be able to access and the extent to which private 
companies must assist in that effort.  GPS tracking might not be far behind.  
Judge Posner opined in Garcia: 
One can imagine the police affixing GPS tracking devices to thousands of cars at 
random, recovering the devices, and using digital search techniques to identify 
suspicious driving patterns.  One can even imagine a law requiring all new cars to 
come equipped with the device so that the government can keep track of all vehicular 
movement in the United States.  It would be premature to rule that such a program of 
mass surveillance could not possibly raise a question under the Fourth Amendment—
that it could not be a search because it would merely be an efficient alternative to 
hiring another 10 million police officers to tail every vehicle on the nation’s roads.90 
Of course, this strikes a familiar chord with those concerned about 
mandatory retention of Internet data by ISPs.  They fear that the 
government could similarly use the vast treasure trove of customer data in 
the Internet context to keep track of all movement in the United States, not 
along the physical highway, but along the information highway.  Another 
commentator explicitly considers this connection between autobahn and 
infobahn: 
Hypothetically, if the police used a device to track where one travels in cyberspace, 
there is no reason to think that the use of such technology would constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.  When one travels along the digital highway, such 
movements are knowingly exposed to the public and merit no Fourth Amendment 
protection.  The digital web where a user journeys would be considered the functional 
equivalent of the public streets.  A cyber-beeper or pen register would seem to 
comport with the Court’s analysis in Smith and Knotts.91 
 
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue 
every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”) (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment).  
89 See supra note 2. 
90 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
91 Brian I. Simon, The Tangled Web We Weave: The Internet and Standing Under the 
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Posner contemplates a regime of wholesale data gathering in the context of 
GPS tracking.  Is mandatory data retention of GPS location data the next 
step in the Jones saga? 
Whatever the future may hold, the Court’s current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence assumes that any information that is not kept completely 
secret is up for grabs.92  I now put forward the reasons why this trend is a 
pernicious one. 
B. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CHANGES IN FOURTH 
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
There are many reasons to fear government surveillance programs 
allowed by the Court’s modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Some 
critics are reminded of Nineteen Eighty-Four and Orwell’s vision of 
totalitarian oversight;93 others are concerned with more creeping 
conceptions of bureaucratic encroachment on civil liberties.94 
In the context of warrantless GPS tracking and mandatory data 
retention, this Comment proposes that the normative justifications for 
changing Fourth Amendment doctrine fall into two central categories: 
particularity and necessity.  By particularity, I mean that the Fourth 
Amendment intends to protect citizens from overly broad government 
intrusion—that it seeks to make intrusions into private life as narrow and 
particular as possible.  Necessity refers to the idea that disclosure of 
personal data has become an almost inevitable requirement for participation 
in modern society. 
1. Particularity 
The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures was largely a response to the English colonial practice of 
issuing writs of assistance.95  Arising from the tradition of so-called general 
warrants issued in England,96 these writs were used by English customs 
 
Fourth Amendment, 21 NOVA L. REV. 941, 967 (1997). 
92 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]hatever the societal 
expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.  I would not assume that 
all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, 
for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
93 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
94 See Solove, supra note 8, at 1101–14. 
95 See generally Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107 
(1986). 
96 For a history of the Fourth Amendment and its colonial roots, see NELSON B. LASSON, 
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
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officers as justification for indiscriminate searches for smuggled goods.97  
Future colonial revolutionaries like John Adams spoke out against the writs 
of assistance as infringing on their rights as individuals.98  Patrick Henry 
himself declared, “They may, unless the general government be restrained 
by a bill of rights, or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and 
rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, everything you eat, drink, and 
wear.  They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.”99 
Early state constitutions adopted safeguards against such arbitrary 
searches and seizures.100  Eventually, these safeguards became federal law 
in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.  Specifically, the language 
“and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized” was an explicit prohibition on the issuing of 
writs of assistance or general warrants. 
That the Framers wanted to prevent overly broad or arbitrary 
government intrusion into individual life is clear.  For the purposes of this 
argument, I will refer to that general principle as the principle of 
particularity.  Behind this principle is the assumption that overbroad 
searches of private citizens are inherently prone to abuse and arbitrary 
action by government officials.  Indeed, the general writs of assistance were 
decried by colonial revolutionaries as “the worst instrument of arbitrary 
power . . . [because they placed] the liberty of every man in the hands of 
every petty officer.”101  If the power to search is too broad, and if every 
person and every piece of data is searchable, the discretion of law 
enforcement officers becomes too powerful.  Only by being particular in 
the description of people and places to be searched can law enforcement 
officers be restrained from exercising arbitrary discretion and using the 
search power to fulfill personal vendettas or perpetrate other abuses.  This is 
what the Fourth Amendment ensures. 
Yet while the Fourth Amendment is the central basis for the system 
that regulates conduct between individuals and the government, its doctrine 
 
CONSTITUTION (1937).  Lasson notes that “[t]hese writs, which received their name from the 
fact that they commanded all officers and subjects of the Crown to assist in their execution, 
were even more arbitrary in their nature and more open to abuse than the general 
warrants . . . .”  Id. at 53–54 (internal citations omitted). 
97 Fisher, supra note 95, at 108–109. 
98 Id. at 109. 
99 Solove, supra note 8, at 1125. 
100 Fisher, supra note 95, at 110.  
101 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 301–03 (1st ed. 
1868)). 
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has stood essentially unchanged as technology advances and offers the 
government more broadly invasive and effective tools for individual 
surveillance.  As Chief Justice Warren remarked in Lopez: 
[T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a great 
danger to the privacy of the individual . . . indiscriminate use of such devices in law 
enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments . . . and these considerations impose a heavier responsibility on this 
Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures in the federal court system.102 
It is this Comment’s contention that the Court has not lived up to the 
responsibility with which Warren felt it was entrusted. 
New technology may encroach on the fundamental principle of 
particularity in two ways.  The first is by allowing surveillance of an 
overbroad number of individuals at once.  The second is by allowing the 
government to gather an overbroad type of information about the 
individuals it surveys. 
The controversies over mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS 
tracking are just two current examples of how technological advances 
implicate these two types of violations of particularity. 
i. Overbroad Types of Information 
With respect to Internet data, an Internet user whose online activities 
are tracked is not the same as a bank user whose deposit slips are searched 
or a telephone user whose dialed numbers are recorded.103  Activity on the 
Internet can be, and usually is, much more comprehensive and revealing 
than banking or dialing phone numbers104 (which, it may be added, may 
both now be done online as well), meaning that law enforcement observers 
may have access to much irrelevant and perhaps personal data.  Internet 
users may undertake a range of private activities online that are unrelated to 
a law enforcement interest: e-mailing friends and family, checking medical 
records, e-mailing doctors, participating in political discussion, or exploring 
sexual proclivities.  Accessing customer data from an ISP is not akin to 
searching a car or a house for drugs or evidence of a specific crime.  It is 
more analogous to following someone, within the home and without, 
listening in on that person’s conversations, reviewing a list of books 
checked out and purchases made, and, in sum, obtaining a complete picture 
 
102 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963). 
103 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435 (1976).  The Greenwood case is another example of a search discovering overly 
broad types of information, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent: “A single bag of trash 
testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the person who produced 
it.”  California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
104 See Tokson, supra note 44, at 602–04. 
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of that person’s life.  This is the quintessential violation of particularity 
against which the Framers wanted to protect when they declared that only 
those warrants could issue that were “particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 
The relatively new technology of GPS tracking devices as used on 
vehicles also implicates particularity in terms of overbroad types of 
information.  As the New York Court of Appeals pointed out in Weaver, 
using a GPS device to track the totality of a vehicle’s movements over an 
extended period of time reveals much more information than does 
following that person in a car for one discrete trip.105  Similarly, in 
Maynard, the D.C. Circuit found that the defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in individual trips taken in public, but did 
have such a reasonable expectation in the totality of his movements, as 
documented by the GPS device over a month-long period.106 
When law enforcement attaches a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle, it 
is true that they might find evidence that the vehicle made stops at 
suspicious locations, as was the case in Pineda-Moreno.  But there is 
nothing in the technology or current Fourth Amendment doctrine that 
prevents law enforcement from seeing every innocent movement the 
vehicle makes, as well.  This is one of the ironies of the technological 
erosion of Fourth Amendment privacy protections: that new technologies 
are advanced enough to provide law enforcement with a way to get the 
information they need, but not yet advanced enough to self-regulate and 
exclude all of the private and probably irrelevant data that they do not need.  
These types of technologies inherently carry the potential to violate the 
particularity principle by giving law enforcement access to an overbroad set 
of data. 
ii. Overbroad Numbers of Individuals 
The outcry over mandatory data-retention laws is largely a response to 
a violation of particularity in terms of the number of individuals who are 
surveilled.  As an attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation warned 
about H.R. 1981, “[t]he data retention mandate in this bill would treat every 
Internet user like a criminal and threaten the online privacy and free speech 
 
105 See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009). 
106 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“It is one thing for 
a passerby to observe or even to follow someone during a single journey as he goes to the 
market or returns home from work.  It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up 
the scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey 
until he has identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that make up that 
person’s hitherto private routine.”). 
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rights of every American.”107  The technological ability and capacity of 
ISPs to retain data on every customer now allows a data-retention regime 
that collects in its net not only those suspected of crimes, but also every 
person who uses that provider’s service.  This is in stark contrast to the 
current regime in the United States, discussed above, which provides for 
data retention only for those customers who are already the subject of a law 
enforcement investigation.  One does not need a very active mind to 
imagine widespread government searches of a database of innocent user 
activity that would root out patterns of “suspicious” Internet use. 
And although GPS tracking technology does not implicate this type of 
particularity quite as explicitly, there is still the potential for the same kind 
of overbroad searching allowed by data retention.  A GPS device does not 
know who drives a vehicle—it only tracks the vehicle itself.  Potentially, 
then, a GPS device like the one used in Jones will track not only the 
Joneses of the world, but also anyone who associates with the Joneses and 
rides in or uses that vehicle: girlfriends of the Joneses, brothers of the 
Joneses, and the children of the Joneses. 
These were the kinds of overbroad searches that Madison and the 
Framers sought to curtail in drafting the Fourth Amendment; much like the 
hated writs of assistance, they encompass either too many individuals, or 
too many types of information, or both. 
Judge Posner remarked in Garcia: 
Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance 
that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive.  Whether and what kind 
of restrictions should, in the name of the Constitution, be placed on such surveillance 
when used in routine criminal enforcement are momentous issues that fortunately we 
need not try to resolve in this case.108 
This Comment contends that the time is ripe for these “momentous issues” 
to be decided and that these violations of the fundamental constitutional 
concept of particularity are grave enough to warrant a change in the 
doctrine. 
2. Necessity in the Internet Age 
The other essential justification for a change in current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine with respect to new technology falls into the category 
of what I refer to here as necessity—i.e., that it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to function in modern society without exposing personal 
information to others. 
The assumption of risk doctrine itself rests on an assumption that the 
 
107 Reitman, supra note 1. 
108 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (2007). 
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giving up of information by an individual is undertaken voluntarily.  In this 
Part, I argue that as new technologies with potential for widespread 
surveillance have become more prevalent in modern society, it has become 
increasingly impractical or even impossible to live one’s life adhering to 
more traditional standards of privacy. 
The Internet is not a fad.  While it might not be discussed in the same 
breath as human necessities like food, water, and shelter, it may not be far 
behind.  In the United States, individuals are increasingly conducting 
business online, communicating online, and entertaining themselves online.  
According to a Nielsen study in 2010, 55% of American adults use the 
Internet every day.109  Forty-five percent of American adults use it to 
communicate every day; 30% use it to get news every day; and 18% use it 
to bank online every day.110  New, unconventional uses are arising all the 
time.  Interactive video games like World of Warcraft, social networking 
giants like Facebook and Twitter, and discussion forums of infinite varieties 
attract millions of active users worldwide. 
The importance of the Internet does not simply follow from the fact of 
its widespread use, but it is increasingly being recognized as an 
indispensable part of the modern experience.  In a recent report, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, recognized the 
importance of the Internet.  According to La Rue, the Internet is 
fundamental for the basic human need to give and receive information, to 
organize, and to express opinions: 
Given that the Internet has become an indispensable tool for realizing a range of 
human rights, combating inequality, and accelerating development and human 
progress, ensuring universal access to the Internet should be a priority for all 
States.111 
A private study commissioned by Internet giant Cisco in 2011 found that 
one-third of college students questioned in fourteen different countries 
agreed that the Internet was as important to them as water, food, air, and 
shelter.112 
 
109 How the World Spends Its Time Online, VISUALECONOMICS, 
http://visualeconomics.creditloan.com/how-the-world-spends-its-time-online_2010-06-16/ 
(last visited May 20, 2013). 
110 Id. 
111 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, 17th Sess. on the Promotion and Prot. of All Human Rights, Civil 
Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, 
Human Rights Council, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue). 
112 CISCO, 2011 CISCO CONNECTED WORLD TECHNOLOGY REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns1120/2011-CCWTR-
Chapter-3-All-Finding.pdf. 
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Is it realistic to ask citizens to make the choice between using the 
Internet and keeping a private life?  More importantly, is it right to ask 
individuals to make that choice?  From a standpoint of protecting civil 
liberties, the answer to these questions must be “no”—but nevertheless it is 
what the courts require of our citizens today.113 
We might go further and consider whether we should ask citizens to 
choose between driving cars and protecting the privacy of their movements 
over extended periods of time.  The potential chilling effect such a choice 
would have on our constitutionally protected fundamental freedom of 
movement is obvious. 
Consider the future implications: what about an advanced device that 
combined facial recognition technology with an aggregation of closed 
circuit commercial video feeds to track individual human movement 
throughout the day?114  In deciding that such a regime would not violate a 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights because they had knowingly exposed 
their public movements to the world, the Court might very well ignore the 
dilemma facing individuals who had a choice between total government 
surveillance and never leaving home. 
As Justice Warren warned, in a regulatory system based on the vague 
and simple language of the Fourth Amendment, much of the responsibility 
for drawing the line in interactions between the citizen and the state falls on 
the Court.115  Yet the Court has largely failed to update its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence since Katz.  Solove declares the Court’s more 
recent Fourth Amendment cases to be the harbingers of a “new Olmstead, 
one that is just as shortsighted and rigid in approach.”116  The Court in 
Olmstead took a narrow formalistic approach to privacy in holding that only 
physical intrusions were government searches.  The Court in Smith, Miller, 
and its other assumption of risk cases adopted a similarly severe approach 
in holding that any information that is “knowingly exposed” cannot be the 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.117  In sum, modern technology 
 
113 See supra Part II.A. 
114 One study conducted in London concluded that the city was home to over 500,000 
closed-circuit television surveillance cameras—one camera for every fourteen people in the 
city.  Michael McCahill & Clive Norris, CCTV in London (Ctr. for Criminology & Crim. 
Just., Working Paper No. 6, 2002), available at http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf. 
115 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963). 
116 Solove, supra note 8, at 1133. 
117 The Court made some attempt to rectify this in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 
(2001).  In that case, federal agents suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana inside his 
suburban home.  They used a thermal-imaging device to scan the outside of his home to 
determine whether the amount of heat emanating from it was consistent with the use of 
certain types of lamps used in the manufacture of marijuana.  The scan showed that the heat 
emanating from particular areas of Kyllo’s home was hotter than the rest of the home, and 
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has effected a fundamental change in society whereby individuals find 
disclosure of personal information inevitable to a certain degree.  The Court 
should update Fourth Amendment doctrine to reflect this change. 
Even if it were not necessary, or even important, to engage with 
modern technology and expose information about oneself, the Court’s 
conception of “privacy” expectations is flawed.  In the Court’s current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, privacy is an all-or-nothing game: either 
there is an expectation of total privacy, or there is no expectation of privacy 
at all.  For example, when an individual has trash in his kitchen trash can, 
that refuse is private, but as soon as the trash is given to the garbage 
collector, it is fair game for all.118  Consider bank records: once they are in 
the hands of a bank, there is no longer any expectation of privacy in those 
records, at least with respect to the government.119  Is this a valid place to 
draw the line?  It seems that most people who have their trash rifled through 
on the curb or their bank records exposed to the public would feel that their 
privacy had been violated to some degree.120  Judge Kozinski put it 
succinctly in his Pineda-Moreno dissent: 
[T]here are many parts of a person’s property that are accessible to strangers for 
limited purposes: the mailman is entitled to open the gate and deposit mail in the front 
door slot; the gas man may come into the yard, go into the basement or look under the 
house to read the meter; the gardener goes all over the property, climbs trees, opens 
sheds, turns on the sprinkler and taps into the electrical outlets . . . .  This doesn’t 
mean that we invite neighbors to use the pool, strangers to camp out on the lawn or 
police to snoop in the garage.121 
Essentially, there is no gray area in current Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.  As soon as privacy is given up with respect to one other person, 
privacy no longer exists with respect to anyone.  As Justice Sotomayor 
pointed out in her concurrence in Jones, “[t]his approach is ill suited to the 
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”122  
 
substantially hotter than neighboring homes.  Based in part on this evidence, agents secured 
a warrant and convicted Kyllo.  Id. at 29–30.  In holding that the use of the thermal-imaging 
device was a Fourth Amendment search, the Court noted that the device was so 
technologically new that it was not in public use and thus that Kyllo could not have expected 
that such a device would invade his privacy.  Id. at 40.  This case only went so far, 
however—the fact that it was the interior of Kyllo’s home seemed to play an important part 
in the Court’s decision.  Id. at 34.  
118 See generally California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
119 See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
120 See infra text accompanying notes 125–135. 
121 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting).  
122 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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While the Court declined to address these issues in Jones, it is likely only a 
matter of time before they present themselves again.  This Part shows that 
these are fundamental problems that demand a change in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
IV. A MODIFIED “REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY” 
In this Part, I present a revised standard of a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” that excludes Katz’s “knowingly exposed” assumption of risk 
exception. 
Part II of this Comment attempted to show that the assumption of risk 
doctrine gives us unreasonable and backward results in applying the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test.  I now propose that the Court should 
adopt a more flexible approach to the Katz test by eliminating the rigid per 
se rule that any information divulged or “knowingly exposed” in any way is 
no longer private.  The remaining part of Katz, Justice Harlan’s now famous 
two-prong inquiry into whether there was an expectation of privacy and 
whether that expectation was reasonable,123 would form the new, modified 
Katz test. 
Much as Katz attempted to bring more flexibility to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence as a response to controversial cases like 
Olmstead, this modified “reasonable expectation of privacy” test should 
allow courts to accept the commonsense notion that privacy is not an all-or-
nothing principle.  Some commentators argue as a whole that Katz cannot 
be saved.124  Although the privacy issues discussed in this Comment do 
bring the whole structure of Katz into question, I contend that in the context 
of access to Internet user data and warrantless GPS tracking, Katz remains a 
viable guide if modified correctly.  In these cases, the Katz test should be 
limited to the two-step inquiry put forward by Justice Harlan, which has the 
benefit of a detailed jurisprudential history immediately familiar to courts.  
The “knowingly exposed” exception to that test, which led to the third-party 
doctrine and warrantless GPS tracking, should be relegated to the dustbin of 
Fourth Amendment history. 
A. APPLICATION TO MANDATORY DATA RETENTION AND 
WARRANTLESS GPS TRACKING 
How would such a modified Katz test treat the two controversies 
considered in this Comment?  Absent the “knowingly exposed” assumption 
of risk exception, the Court would look first to whether there was an actual, 
subjective expectation of privacy and then to whether society was prepared 
 
123 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
124 See, e.g., Skok, supra note 23, at 82.  
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to deem that expectation a reasonable one. 
Is it reasonable to expect that telling something to a friend, or handing 
over records to a bank, exposes that information to government agents?  
Commonsense expectations aside, empirical studies suggest that, for most, 
the answer is no.125  The authors of one study asked individuals to rank 
various investigative police actions on a scale of how intrusive they felt the 
actions to be.  Some of the survey results showed that actual expectations of 
privacy generally mapped onto the Court’s conception of those 
expectations.  For example, searching a bedroom and bugging a phone were 
both seen by survey respondents as highly intrusive searches, views which 
the Court’s cases would corroborate.126 
Other results, however, showed a significant disparity in what the 
Court considers intrusive and what reasonable people consider intrusive.  
The use of undercover agents, repeatedly held by the Court not to implicate 
the Fourth Amendment under the assumption of risk doctrine,127 was seen 
by survey respondents as very intrusive.128  Perusing bank records, held not 
to be a Fourth Amendment search under the third-party doctrine in 
Miller,129 was similarly seen by respondents as a highly intrusive search.130  
While “using a beeper to track car” was somewhat lower on the 
intrusiveness rankings,131 this survey was conducted in the early 1990s and 
the question was presumably based on the facts of Knotts.  We might 
imagine what the result would have been if the question were changed to 
“using a GPS device to track every movement of car for a month.”  In fact, 
in a more recent survey conducted by Zachary Gray of UC Hastings, Gray 
explicitly considered society’s expectations of privacy related to more 
modern GPS vehicle tracking as in Jones.132  His conclusion was that 
“[s]ociety overwhelmingly believes that GPS tracking is unjustifiable and 
violates an individual’s privacy rights.”133 
The results of these surveys show that under the modified Katz test 
proposed here, the Court would at the very least be forced to find a serious 
 
125 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings 
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 739 (1993). 
126 Id.  
127 See supra Part I. 
128 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 125, at 740. 
129 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–43 (1976). 
130 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 125, at 740. 
131 Id. at 737–38. 
132 Zachary Gray, Note, Herding Katz: GPS Tracking and Society’s Expectations of 
Privacy in the 21st Century, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 145, 147–48 (2012). 
133 Id. at 166. 
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constitutional problem with those regimes.134  Such a test would set courts 
free to follow the logic of the D.C. Circuit in Maynard: “In considering 
whether something is ‘exposed’ to the public as that term was used in Katz 
we ask not what another person can physically and may lawfully do but 
rather what a reasonable person expects another might actually do.”135 
This section has attempted to show that a modified Katz test rejecting 
the assumption of risk exception would find serious constitutional problems 
with both mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS tracking.  In the 
next section, I will address the main counterarguments against this proposed 
test. 
B. FUTURE APPLICATIONS AND CONCERNS 
There are viable concerns with this modified Katz test.  One is the 
difficulty it might pose for law enforcement, both in terms of requiring 
complicated decisions by police officers and in hindering efficient 
searching.  A more important concern from the privacy advocate’s 
perspective is that, like current Katz jurisprudence, it leaves open the 
possibility of future erosion of privacy by advancing technology.  I address 
these arguments in turn. 
1. Law Enforcement Concerns 
One criticism of this modified Katz test, and indeed of any change to 
current doctrine that allows for greater privacy protection under the Fourth 
Amendment, is that it will increase the cost of effective law enforcement 
and may allow some criminals to go free.136  Since more law enforcement 
actions will now be considered searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
officers will be forced to obtain more warrants, thus increasing the cost and 
decreasing the efficiency of law enforcement.  Many also argue that in the 
wake of September 11, 2001, the government has a greater interest in 
 
134 As the authors of the study point out, the Court has been reluctant to embrace 
empirical studies in its opinions.  This aside, the point still remains that the Court would at 
least be forced to consider what reasonable expectations of privacy might be if the 
assumption of risk doctrine were rejected.  See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 125, at 
742–43. 
135 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).  For 
a convincing argument that people may reasonably expect that digital information is being 
reviewed by automated systems, but not by actual human beings or government agents, see 
Tokson, supra note 44, at 581. 
136 See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Of course the 
[Fourth] amendment cannot sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in 
the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.  There is a tradeoff between 
security and privacy, and often it favors security.”). 
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obtaining personal information.137  While this may be true, this Comment 
has attempted to show that the consequences of the assumption of risk 
doctrine have resulted in regimes of government investigation that are 
broadly invasive and that ignore that changing technology has made it 
almost a necessity to expose personal information in the course of everyday 
life.138  Efficient law enforcement is a legitimate and important government 
interest, but it must be balanced against competing interests of privacy.139 
While this balancing of interests does require a complicated normative 
assessment, the current regime seems to resolve each question in favor of 
law enforcement interests at the expense of privacy interests.140  The 
discussion of particularity and necessity above attempts to show that the 
privacy rights abrogated under current Fourth Amendment doctrine are 
fundamental and require more weight in this test. 
A similar argument may be made that police officers should not be 
required to make difficult decisions on the ground about what activity is 
permitted and what activity is not.  It is true that the modified Katz test 
proposed here, which eliminates the “knowingly exposed” exception, would 
redefine some law enforcement actions as searches which previously were 
not.  This has the potential for engendering uncertainty as law enforcement 
agencies struggle to define what is a search under the new test.  Simplicity, 
though, is not the essential aim of the modified Katz test proposed here—
rather, the principal aim is privacy protection.  Moreover, complexity is 
nothing new for law enforcement in this area: Fourth Amendment doctrine 
is already a notoriously tangled web of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.141  Law enforcement officers will still need to make difficult 
decisions about what constitutes a search, but no more than they need to 
today. 
The activities with which this Comment is concerned, furthermore, are 
not the types of activities that require heat-of-the-moment decisions, such as 
stops and frisks, vehicle stops, or the appropriate use of force.  Data 
retention and GPS tracking are methodical surveillance techniques that 
require advance planning.  Therefore, law enforcement would not be unduly 
 
137 See Solove, supra note 8, at 1097–98. 
138 See supra Part II.B. 
139 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706 (1981) (referring to the “general rule that 
the Fourth Amendment . . . perform[s] the constitutional balance between police objectives 
and personal privacy”) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
140 See supra Part I. 
141 See, e.g., Note, The Fourth Amendment’s Third Way, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1628 
(2007) (referring to the Court’s Fourth Amendment Katz doctrine as a “vast maze” 
consisting of “a multitude of exceptions and exemptions” to the warrant requirement and 
“doctrinal nooks and crannies”). 
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hindered by having to acquire a warrant or make difficult decisions before 
conducting these types of technology-heavy activities. 
2. Future Privacy Erosion and Other Possible Alternatives to Katz 
Another criticism of Katz in general is that, by depending in part on an 
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy, it allows for the gradual 
erosion of those expectations as the government uses more invasive means 
of investigation.142  For example, what if the government took out a 
television advertisement during the Super Bowl and announced that it 
would begin tapping all phone conversations or that it would read all 
personal e-mails?  Individuals might then have lost their subjective 
expectation of privacy under Katz—even the modified Katz test proposed 
here—and those e-mails or phone conversations would no longer be 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Although a comprehensive response 
to this general criticism of Katz is somewhat outside the scope of this 
Comment, until such drastic action occurs, we have not yet reached the 
point where we need to resolve this problem.  As I argued in the preceding 
Part, there exists today a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy in 
both warrantless GPS tracking and Internet usage data that is circumvented 
only by the assumption of risk exception.  Absent that loophole, courts 
would be forced to consider whether there was a subjective and reasonable 
expectation of privacy in those activities and they would likely conclude 
that there is.143 
Some commentators, in looking for an immediate answer to future 
erosion of privacy, have proposed that Katz be completely discarded.144  
Skok, for instance, proposes that Katz be overturned and advocates instead 
for the Court to undertake the normative inquiry it used previously in Smith 
v. Maryland.145  Under this test, the Court would ignore the two-part inquiry 
of Katz and ask instead: “should an individual in a free and open society be 
forced to assume the risk that the government will monitor her as she 
engages in the activity at issue?”146  Skok argues that the Court would 
answer this central question by looking to constitutional principles and to 
what the Framers intended to protect.147 
This test has the benefit of hitching the Fourth Amendment to 
something that appears concrete—the original intent of the Framers.  This 
 
142 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“The Katz test . . . has often been 
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”). 
143 See supra Part III.A.  
144 See, e.g., Skok, supra note 23, at 82. 
145 See id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 82–83. 
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alleviates the concern that as new technology arises, subjective expectations 
of privacy will simply be eroded over time.  Its drawback, ironically, is this 
very detachment from changing expectations of privacy in modern society.  
There are privacy questions today that simply do not allow for easy 
comparisons to the issues of the colonial era.  Modern police forces were 
not contemplated in the late eighteenth century.148  We do not know what 
the Framers would have thought of GPS tracking of vehicles.  While 
personal papers and letters to friends may have been sacred to the 
Framers,149 we do not know how they would have felt about Facebook posts 
or Web histories, and there is no way to ask them. 
We have a much better idea, however, of how people feel about 
modern privacy issues today.  If we want more data to determine how 
people feel about various invasions of privacy in the modern world, we 
have the tools and the opportunity to collect it.150  Retaining the part of Katz 
that anchors it to current societal expectations of privacy avoids asking the 
Court to make guesses about original intent. 
In a response specific to the third-party doctrine, Professor Stephen 
Henderson sets forth four factors to consider in determining the expectation 
of privacy of a transferor of information to a third party.  They are: the 
necessity of transferring the information to meaningful participation in 
society; the extent to which the information is personal; the extent to which 
the information is accessible to nongovernment persons outside of the 
transferee; and the extent to which existing law restricts or allows access to 
the information.151  Although this test is rather complex, Henderson notes 
that there are few easy answers in the Fourth Amendment/privacy 
protection debate.152 
Henderson’s test may be a significant step in the right direction in 
terms of the third-party doctrine.  Indeed, it overlaps somewhat with the 
argument presented here.  However, as this Comment has argued, the 
underlying problem with the third-party doctrine is the assumption of risk 
exception to Katz, which leaves information unprotected even if it is not 
exposed to a particular third-party institution.  As in the case of GPS 
tracking, the information may simply be exposed to the public at large.153  
 
148 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry 
v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 341–46 (2010). 
149 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886). 
150 See supra Part III.A. 
151 See Stephen Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United 
States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 803, 815–17. 
152 Id. at 823–24. 
153 See supra Part II.A. 
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My proposed modified Katz test thus addresses a somewhat broader 
concern than does Henderson’s four-factor solution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that the current controversies over 
mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS tracking are symptoms of the 
same problem: Katz’s assumption of risk doctrine.  It further argued that 
changing technology and a static interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
have allowed for a regime in which searches are overbroad both with 
respect to people searched and information obtained.  The rationale that 
information “voluntarily exposed” is no longer private must now be 
considered obsolete in an age where exposing some amount of personal 
information is necessary to navigate society. 
Under a new conception of the two-part Katz test which excludes the 
“knowingly exposed” exception to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
analysis, both mandatory data retention and warrantless GPS tracking 
would pose serious constitutional questions—which they should.  Katz’s 
rigid assumption of risk rule must be changed to keep up with the times. 
 
